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An Efficient Privacy-preserving
Authentication Scheme for Energy Internet-based
Vehicle-to-Grid Communication
Prosanta Gope, Member, IEEE and Biplab Sikdar, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The Energy Internet (EI) represents a new electric
grid infrastructure that uses computing and communication to
transform legacy power grids into systems that support open
innovation. EI provides bidirectional communication for analysis
and improvement of energy usage between service providers and
customers. To ensure a secure, reliable and efficient operation,
the EI should be protected from cyber attacks. Thus, secure and
efficient key establishment is an important issue for this Internet-
based smart grid environment. In this paper, we propose an
efficient privacy-preserving authentication scheme for EI-based
Vehicle-to-Grid Communication using lightweight cryptographic
primitives such as one-way non-collision hash functions. In our
proposed scheme, a customer can securely access services pro-
vided by the service provider using a symmetric key established
between them. Detailed security and performance analysis of
our proposed scheme are presented to show that it is resilient
against many security attacks, cost effective in computation and
communication, and provides an efficient solution for the EI.
Index Terms—Energy internet, mutual authentication, ad-
vanced metering infrastructure, smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy, science and economy can mutually reinforce each
other through new synergies and bring about greater effi-
ciencies. From the perspective of sustainable development of
society, the exploitation and utilization of the renewable energy
and replacing traditional fossil fuels are important directions
for reforming the energy landscape. However, the traditional
grid structure makes it difficult to meet the requirements
associated with integrating renewables and distributed gener-
ation, and incorporate other mechanisms to improve energy
efficiency. In order to address these issues, the concept of
Energy Internet has been proposed that seeks to integrate
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), cyber-
physical systems and power system technologies to develop
the next-generation of smart grids [1], [31]. Analogous to the
conventional Internet, the idea of EI has been introduced to
allow energy to be shared similar to information sharing in the
Internet [30]. The fundamental idea behind the EI is to com-
bine economics, information and energy using the power grid
as the backbone network to provide an open and egalitarian
framework for exchanging energy and associated information.
The EI is designed to facilitate the seamless integration of
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diverse energy sources with the grid, and facilitate the inter-
action between various elements of the power grid to achieve
increase in energy efficiencies [2]. All aspects of a power grid
such as generation, transmission, distribution, service provider,
operations, markets, and customers will benefit from secure
and efficient communication on decisions about energy and
information flow [25-26]. Finally, compared with smart grids,
EI further integrates other energy networks such as gas for
improved energy operations.
Vehicle to Grid (V2G) technology broadly consists of sys-
tems that facilitate the bi-directional flow of electrical energy
between vehicles and the electrical grid. Electrical energy may
flow from the grid to the vehicle to charge the battery and it
may also flow in the reserve direction when the grid requires
energy (e.g., to provide peaking power). With bi-directional
chargers, electric vehicles (EVs) can become participants in
the V2G eco-system, and such vehicles are energy assets for
the smart grid. EVs need to charge and draw power from
the grid when the State of Charge (SOC) of their batteries
becomes low. The V2G property of EVs would also allow
EVs to deliver power back to the grid and the concept of
EI in V2G networks can be used to allow energy to be
transported from vehicles to a location where it is used to
perform useful work. One of the key benefits of EI in V2G
environments is that it allows individuals (e.g., EV owners,
households etc.) to trade energy without the need to build
their own transmission and distribution networks [31]. With
EI-based V2G, the unstable and intermittent energy generated
by renewable energy sources (mainly solar and wind energy
sources) can be used by EVs two provide two benefits. First,
it provides a way to address the large energy demand of EVs
through renewable energy sources, thus reducing the potential
adverse impact of EVs on power grids. Second, it prevents
renewable energy from being wasted when they are generated
during low demand periods of traditional (non-EV) loads. This
allows more efficient use of energy and can hence facilitate the
wider adoption of renewable energy. EI-based V2G systems
also have other applications, including power dispatch between
cities, power transfer from renewable energy sources to end
users, etc.
In addition to the routing of energy between various entities,
the exchange of information is an important aspect of the
EI and EI-based V2G systems. A number of protocols have
been proposed for information exchange in EI based systems.
The ISO/IEC/IEEE 18880 standard defines communication
protocols and architectures for the EI. It defines the data
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Table I
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATED SCHEMES
Scheme Primitive Used Mobilty Support Location Privacy Support
[4] ECC, Bilinear Pairing No No
[5] ECC, Bilinear Pairing No No
[6] Bilinear Pairing No No
[7] AES-CBC, Hash function No No
[8] Bilinear Pairing, Hash function No No
[9] Bilinear Pairing, Hash function No No
[10] Bilinear Pairing,Hash function No No
[11] PUF, Hash function No No
[12-15] Public-key sign-encryption Yes Most of them cannot
[21-25] Public-key sign-encryption Yes Most of them cannot
IEC15118 ECDSA Yes No
OCPP ECDSA Yes No
Proposed Scheme Hash function Yes Yes
exchange protocols and the network architecture for integrat-
ing various components and participants in the grid, data
storage, and application services. ISO/IEC/IEEE 18880 uses
wide area communications using TCP/IP, and existing non-
TCP/IP networks can connect through multi-protocol gate-
ways. ISO/IEC/IEEE 18881 and ISO/IEC/IEEE 18883 have
been developed to address network management and network
security issues that are neglected in ISO/IEC/IEEE 18880. In
contrast, V2G communications typically just focus on the com-
munication between the vehicles, charging stations, and the
grid. In V2G, Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) (i.e.,
EV chargers), such as those in charging stations, can be shared
by many customers. Therefore, a temporal association between
the EV and the EVSE has to be initiated for the charging and
billing process when the charging cable is inserted. In this
regard, some EVs and EVSEs use the IEC 15118 standard
for communication. Similarly, EVSEs use Open Charge Point
Protocol (OCPP) for communication between the EVSE and
the energy management systems. While EI-based V2G has
many benefits (as mentioned above), cyber-security of the
components and data are big concerns [28-29]. The vehicles
themselves face increasingly complex attacks that target not
only the vehicle’s operation but also its privacy. Threats to
privacy include the exposure of the vehicle user’s real identity,
the vehicle’s driving path, location, and disclosure of other
private information. Thus, there are significant challenges to
the design of security mechanisms for V2G environments
and these are further complicated by the topological structure
autonomy and fast rate of transformations due to vehicular
movement. A number of organizations are working on the
development of security solutions for the EI [2-3].
A. Related Work
Secure communication is one of the most important re-
quirements for the EI environment in order to guarantee
secure exchange of data at all times. For secure and efficient
data exchange between the components, protocols with high
security and performance are required. To address this issue,
many researchers have proposed several mutual authentication
and key establishment schemes suitable for the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) with various security consid-
erations and goals. Mohammadali et al. [4] proposed two
ECC-based identity-based key establishment protocols. The
protocols reduce the computational overhead at the smart
meter side of the AMI, and they are resilient against replay
and desynchronization attacks. However, they are vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle, impersonation, and false data injection
attacks, and they incur high computational cost during key
establishment. Nicanfar et al. [5] introduced two key exchange
protocols that are based on the use of a symmetric-key algo-
rithm and ECC. The protocols provide security and scalability
for key exchange in smart grids. However, they are vulnerable
to false data injection attacks. Moreover, both the protocols
incur large computational costs which makes them unsuitable
for resource limited devices in smart grids.
Wu and Zhou [6] presented an authentication and key
distribution scheme by combining symmetric key and public
key cryptographic systems, and the authors claim that their
scheme can eliminate man-in-the-middle and reply attacks.
Subsequently, Xia and Wang showed that [6] cannot ensure
security against man-in-the-middle attacks and they also pro-
posed a new data aggregation scheme [7]. However, Park
et al. reported that the scheme presented in [7] is insecure
against impersonation attacks [8]. Besides, it cannot address
the customer’s privacy requirements. Tsai et al. combined an
identity-based signature scheme and an identity-based encryp-
tion scheme [9] for key distribution in smart grids. Odelu et
al. investigated the protocol presented in [9] and demonstrated
that it cannot guarantee the security of the session key and
the strong credentials privacy of the smart meter [10]. They
also introduced a new scheme with a claim that is can
reduce computation overheads. However, Chen et al. proved
that the scheme presented in [10] is vulnerable to several
attacks, and it has large computational and communication
costs. Moreover, our analysis shows that the scheme in [10] is
weak against man-in-the-middle attacks which may lead to
DoS attacks at the server end. In this context, an attacker
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Table II
SYMBOLS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTION
Symbol Definition
IDCS Identity of charging station
PIDi Pseudo identity of Useri
ki Secret key of the Useri
pswi Password of the Useri
βi Thumbprint of the Useri
SK Session key (Useri -CSj )
Kcu Shared secret key between the CSj and USP
LAIx Location area identifier of the entity x
h(·) One-way hash function
⊕ Exclusive-OR operation
|| Concatenation operation
(say Eve) can capture the initial message (Msg1 in [10]),
alter the message, and then send the altered message Msge1
to the service provider (SP). The SP can only decide about
the validity of a request message (Msge1 ) after completing the
whole process, i.e., after receiving the response message (Msg3
in [10]). Consequently, each request is stored in a buffer, where
several intensive pairings first need to be computed, followed
by submission response. This buffer needs to be kept open
until a response from the smart meter (SM) is received. As
a consequence, the memory can easily overflow if a large
number of invalid requests are sent, since the invalid requests
cannot be distinguished due to the late detection of the forged
messages. In [11], the authors have considered the physical
security of the smart meter and they proposed an authenti-
cation scheme by using the concept of physical unclonable
functions (PUFs). In addition to [4-11], some recent studies
on privacy issues in V2G communications have appeared in
literature [12-15,21-25]. In these schemes, privacy of the car
owner is considered as an important concern. However, in
these schemes an EV needs to perform several computationally
inefficient cryptographic primitives such as group signature,
sign-encryption, etc. Besides, most of these schemes cannot
ensure the location privacy of the EV user, which is essential
for securely monitoring the status of the EV and efficiently
providing services to the EV user. Table I compares related
work to our approach with respect to the primitive used, ability
for mobility support, and location privacy.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we first introduce a new model for EI-based
V2G communication. Subsequently, we propose a lightweight
authentication and key establishment scheme for EI-based
V2G communication. The major contributions of this paper
can be summarized as follows:
• A new model for EI-based V2G communication, which
allows an EV user to seamlessly charge or discharge
the battery of his/her vehicle from the charging stations
located in different geographical locations. However, the
charging/discharging rate may vary based on the location
of the charging station.
• An efficient privacy-preserving authentication protocol,
which provides several key security properties including
Authentication Key Exchange (AKE) security, privacy of
the user, protection against eavesdropping or interception
attacks, protection against man-in-the middle attacks, and
location privacy, which are all requirements for secure EI-
based V2G communication [32-33]. There are some ex-
isting schemes which can ensure most of the security re-
quirements for EI-based V2G communication. However,
they use computationally expensive public-key crypto-
graphic primitives. On the contrary, the proposed scheme
is based lightweight cryptographic primitives such as one-
way hash function and exclusive-OR operation, which
creates significantly less computational overhead on the
resource limited user’s device (as shown in Table V).
• Most of the existing schemes including the existing
underlying communication protocols such as IEC15118
and OCPP for V2G communications are vulnerable to
some of the well-known security attacks such as man-in-
the middle attacks, impersonation attacks, etc. Therefore,
we provide a rigorous formal security analysis of our
proposed scheme using the BR93-model [18] to show
that it is secure against such attacks.
• A comparative study of the proposed scheme with closely
related existing schemes. It is shown that the proposed
scheme is secure and computationally efficient, and re-
quires significantly lower overhead for establishing a
session key between an user’s device and the charging
station, as compared to the related existing schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present our system and adversary model. In
Section III we introduce the proposed scheme. The formal
security analysis and performance analysis of the proposed
scheme are presented in Section IV and Section V, respec-
tively. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI. The
symbols and cryptographic functions of the proposed scheme
are defined in Table II.
II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
A. System Model for EI-based V2G Communication
Fig. 1 shows the system model for an EI-based V2G
environment, which consists of three major components: a set
of EV users each with a mobile device (MD) connected to the
Internet, a set of charging stations (CSs), and a utility service
provider (USP). The USP consists of two components: power
generation, distribution, and management center (PGDMC)
and data center (DC). Each user is required to register their
EV with the USP. Then, the USP maintains all the user
information in its data center. In this network model, the USP
is an organization that is responsible for procuring electricity
from various vendors. The USP also supplies electricity to
charging stations in different locations. These charging stations
may be owned by several private companies. A user may
charge/discharge the batteries of his/her EV from/to any of
the CSs. However, the charging/discharging rate may vary
based on the location of the CS. For example, the charg-
ing/discharging rate of the CSs located at commercial area
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Figure 1. System model for the proposed scheme.
networks (CANs) may be higher than others. On the other
hand, the charging/discharging rate of public area networks
(PANs) may be lower than residential area networks (RANs).
We assume that a secure channel is available between an EV
user and the USP during the initial registration. Subsequently,
each user with a mobile device communicates with the CS
through the Internet. A CS may communicate with the USP
through the public Internet or private networks. In this model,
two types of flows, i.e., energy flows (shown by dotted lines)
and data flows (shown by solid lines) have been considered.
All the entities (user, CS and USP) need to authenticate
themselves before sharing any information. Because of the
public network based communication used in the system
environment, there is a possibility of various attacks, such as
replay, man-in-the middle, and impersonation attacks. In our
scheme, users use biometrics (e.g., fingerprints) in addition to
a password for two-factor authentication.
B. Adversary Model
During user registration, a user and the USP interact through
a secure channel. On the other hand, during the execution
of the proposed authenticated key agreement scheme, all
parties communicate through an insecure public channel. In
this context, we consider the Dolev-Yao threat model (DY
model) [29], where an adversary may eavesdrop, modify, or
delete the messages exchanged during transmission. Now, due
to the usage of public networks and wireless communication
in this EI-based V2G environment, there is a possibility of
several attacks, such as impersonation, man-in-the middle,
replay attacks, etc. The user’s privacy is another important
issue in this environment. Also, an adversary can impersonate
as a legitimate user and try to obtain services. Similarly, a
charging station may impersonate as others and ask for higher
charges from a user. Hence, there is a need for an authenticated
key agreement scheme by which the legitimacy of the entities
can be verified, and also both the user and CS can establish a
session key.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our proposed lightweight au-
thentication protocol for EI-based V2G communication, where
a user (Useri ) who has mobile device MDi with Internet
connectivity requests charging of his/her EV’s battery from
a charging station CSj . In this regard, both Useri and CSj
need to authenticate each other with the help of the USP.
After successful mutual authentication between Useri and
CSj , both entities will establish a session key SK for their
secure communication. Our proposed scheme consists of the
following two phases: user registration and authentication.
A. User Registration Phase
Each user first needs to register with the USP. The registra-
tion process consists of the following steps:
Step R1: Useri sends the registration request along with
its identity IDi to the USP through the secure (out-of-band)
channel.
Step R2: Upon receiving the request, the USP creates
an account and inserts a new row in its database. It then
randomly generates a unique pseudo identity PIDi , a secret
key ki , and also generates a set of shadow identities SID =
{sid1 , sid2 , · · · , sidn}, which are later used in case of loss
of synchronization between the USP and Useri . Next, the
USP composes a message with {PIDi , ki ,SID} and sends it
to Useri through the secure channel. Finally, the USP stores
{PIDi , ki ,SID} in its database for further interaction with
Useri .
Step R3: Upon receiving {PIDi , ki ,SID} from the USP,
the user inputs his/her biometrics (e.g., thumbprint) βi and
password pswi and computes k
∗
i = ki ⊕ h(βi||pswi). Finally,
Useri stores {PIDi , k
∗
i ,SID} in his/her mobile device for
further communication with the USP.
B. Authentication Phase
To accomplish communication security, Useri has to go
through an authentication process each time before obtaining
services from charging station CSj . The authentication phase
of the proposed scheme comprises of the following steps:
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Figure 2. Steps and computations in the key agreement phase of proposed scheme.
Step 1: Useri inputs his/her thumbprint βi and password
pswi into his/her mobile device MDi . The mobile device then
computes αi = h(βi) and ∂
′
i = h(αi||pswi), and validates
the user’s legitimacy. If the user’s validation is successful,
then the device calculates ki = k
∗
i ⊕ h(βi||pswi). After that,
the user generates a nonce Nu and finds his/her location area
identity, LAIu , using the MD’s location service. Next, Useri
computes EL = LAIu
⊕
h(ki ||Nu), a key-hash response
V1 = h(PIDi ||Nu ||ki ||EL), and subsequently composes a
message MA1 : {PIDi ,Nu ,EL,V1} and sends it to charging
station CSj .
Step 2: Upon arrival of message MA1 , charging sta-
tion CSj generates a nonce Nc and computes V2 =
h(IDcs ||Nc ||Kcu ||LAIcs), where LAIcs denotes the location
area identifier of charging station CSj . Next, CSj composes a
message MA2 : {MA1 , IDcs ,Nc ,LAIcs ,V2} and sends it to
the USP.
Step 3: Upon arrival of message MA2 , the USP first locates
PIDi in its database and then computes and validates the key
hash responses V1 and V2 . Next, the USP decodes LAIu from
EL and then compares and validates LAIu with LAIcs . If the
validation is successful, the USP generates a key SK and a
new pseudo identity PIDnewi . It then computes PID
new∗
i =
PIDnewi
⊕
h(PIDi ||ki), SKu = h(IDu ||ki ||Nu)
⊕
SK ,
SKcs = h(IDcs ||Kcu ||Na)
⊕
SK , V3 = h(SKcs ||Kcu ||Nc),
and V4 = h(SKu ||ki ||PID
new∗
i ). Next, the USP composes
a message MA3 : {(PID
new∗
i ,SKu ,V4 )||(SKcs ,V3 )} and
sends MA3 to charging station CSj .
Step 4: Upon arrival of the response message MA3 from
the USP, the charging station first computes and validates the
key-hash response V3 . If the validation is successful, CSj
decodes the session key SK = h(IDcs ||Kcu ||Na)
⊕
SKcs and
composes a new message MA4 : {(PID
new∗
i ,SKu ,V4 )} and
then sends it to Useri .
Step 5: Upon arrival of message MA4 , Useri first
verifies the key-hash response V4 . If the validation is
successful, Useri computes and decodes the session key
SK = h(IDu ||ki ||Nu)
⊕
SKu , and the new pseudo identity
PIDnewi = PID
new∗
i
⊕
h(PIDi ||ki) for the next round.
The entities involved in the protocol will stop the execu-
tion of the scheme if any of the above verification steps is
unsuccessful. For dealing with the loss of synchronization
problem, instead of the pseudo identity PIDi , Useri needs
to select one of the unused shadow identities sidx from
SID = {sid1 , sid2 , · · · , sidn} and send it in message MA1 .
On receiving this message and after successfully validating the
user, the USP generates a new pseudo identity and securely
sends it in message MA3 by using the secret key ki . At the
end of the authentication process, both Useri and the USP
delete the used shadow identity sidx from their storage. Also,
in the proposed scheme, Useri can only use almost t shadow
identities, where t < n − 1. After that, the user needs to
request for reloading. In this context, the user sends a “Re-
Load” message to the USP. On receiving that message, the
USP generates a new set of shadow identities and then securely
sends it in message MA3 by using the secret key ki . Details
of this phase are depicted in Fig. 2.
Remark 1: In our proposed scheme, if a user needs to
charge or discharge his/her vehicle multiple times in a day,
then he/she needs to go through the authentication process
each time, even if the same EV is used. Besides, since one
of the goals of the proposed scheme is to achieve location
privacy, we do not keep any footprint of the CSs. Therefore,
even if the EV uses the same CS multiple times, it needs to
execute the proposed anonymous authentication process. Since
our proposed scheme is based on lightweight cryptographic
primitives such as hash functions, it has a lower computational
cost (execution times are shown in Table III and Table IV).
Besides, from Table IV we can see that the communication
cost of the proposed scheme is significantly less than the other
schemes. On the other hand, in our proposed scheme, we allow
a user to have a single account for multiple EVs, which will
avoid any increase in the credential storage requirement.
Remark 2: Now, we consider the scenario where two
users Useri and Userj share a vehicle. In such cases, dur-
ing registration the USP will generate two sets of security
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credentials {PIDi , ki ,SIDi} and {PIDj , kj ,SIDj} under the
same account and send them to Useri and Userj , respectively.
After receiving their credentials, both the users securely store
them in their respective mobile devices (as shown in Step R3).
Now, when Useri uses the vehicle then he/she needs to use
{PIDi , ki ,SIDi} to get through the authentication process.
Similarly, when user Userj uses the vehicle then he/she is
required to use {PIDj , kj ,SIDj} in order to authenticate with
the USP. In this way, the proposed scheme can support the
scenario where a vehicle is shared among multiple users.
However, in this context, the storage complexity at the USP
will increase linearly with the number of shared users.
IV. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents the formal security proof of the pro-
posed scheme. We first demonstrate that our proposed scheme
is secure.
A. Definitions and Assumptions
Bellare and Rogaway introduced a theoretical security proof
for an authentication and key exchange protocol for a symmet-
ric two-party case, which we refer to as the BR93-Model [18].
During the authentication process only the USP can authen-
ticate a user, and a CS needs to forward the authentication
request of the user to the USP. Thus, we assume that the
communication between the CS and USP is secure, so that
the USP and the CS can be regarded as a single participant
and we call it the service agent (SA).
1) Complexity Assumptions: The security of our proposed
scheme is based on the secure one-way hash function, which
can be regarded as a pseudorandom function [19]. Therefore,
we first introduce the security definitions of pseudorandom
functions and show their game environments that will be used
for the security proofs of the proposed scheme.
Definition 1: Let f be a polynomial-time computable
function and AdvH = |Pr[Hf = 1] − Pr[Hf
′
= 1]|
denote the advantage of an algorithm H , controlled by a
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, in distinguishing
f from another function f ′. We say that f is a (n, q, ε)-secure
pseudorandom function if there is no feasible algorithm H
that can distinguish f from f ′ with advantage AdvH ≥ ε,
while making at most q oracle queries to f or a truly random
function f ′ and running at most n times by playing the
following game:
Initialization: A challenger C interacting with A picks a
random bit b ∈ {0, 1} to determine the function fb, where f0
is a pseudorandom function and f1 is a truly random function.
Training Phase: A issues q queries, x1, · · · , xq to C, where
xi ∈ {0, 1}
∗ are binary strings of arbitrary length. The
challenger responds to these queries by sending fb(xi) to A
for i = 1, · · · , q, where fb(xi) ∈ {0, 1}
l and l is a fixed
positive integer.
Guess: A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} as a guess of b. A wins this
game if b′ = b. We define the advantage of A winning the
game as Advf0,A = |Pr[b
′ = b]− 12 |.
According to the pseudorandom function assumption, no
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can win the above
game with non-negligible advantage.
2) Security Model and Notations: Protocol Participants:∏s
A,B denotes the oracle which plays the role of A to interact
with B in session s, and
∏t
A,B denotes the oracle which plays
the role B to interact with A in session t, where A,B ∈ I ,
s, t ∈ N , I is the set of identities of the players such as a user
and the service agent who participate in the protocol, and N
is the set of positive integers.
Protocols: The proposed authentication scheme uses a
three-party authentication and key exchange scheme. However,
the protocol can be reduced to a de facto two-party setting
protocol. Therefore, we define a two-party authentication and
key exchange protocol as follows.
Definition 2: A two-party authentication and key exchange
protocol P , is formally specified by an efficiently computable
function
∏
on the following inputs:
k: The length of the security parameter used in the protocol.
A: The identity of the initiator of P , where A ∈ I .
B: The identity of the intended partner of P , where B ∈ I .
x: The secret information, where x ∈ {0, 1}∗.
K: The conversation in P so far.
r: The random coin flips of the sender or initiator, where
r ∈ {0, 1}+.
The output of
∏
(k,A,B, x,K, r) = (m, δ, α) is defined as
follows:
m: The next message to be sent, where m ∈ {0, 1}
⋃
{∗},
where {∗} specifies that the initiator sends no message.
δ: The decision, where δ ∈ {A,R, ∗}, and A, R, and *
denote accept, reject, and no decision, respectively.
α : The private output, where α ∈ {0, 1}∗
⋃
{∗} and {∗}
denotes that the initiator does not have any private output.
3) Adversary Model: An adversary A is a probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machine during the execution of pro-
tocol P . A can control the channel between A and B by
eavesdropping on the messages sent by A and B, modifying
these messages, and compromising the session secrets shared
between A and B. These behaviors can be modeled by the
following queries.
Execute(
∏s
A,B ,
∏t
B,A): This query models all kinds of
passive attacks, where a passive adversary can intercept all
the data exchanged between
∏s
A,B and
∏t
B,A in a session of
P .
Send(
∏s
A,B ,m): This query models active attacks, where
an adversary sends a message m to
∏s
A,B and obtains a
response message according to the proposed scheme.
Reveal(
∏s
A,B): This query models the exposure of session
keys (known session key attacks) in a particular session s.
Corrupt(
∏s
A,B): This query models the revelation of long-
term secret keys. This query models passive attacks.
Test(
∏s
A,B): When
∏s
A,B has accepted and shared a
session key, adversary A can make this query and try to
distinguish a real session key from a random string.
4) Security Definitions: Before defining the notion of mu-
tual authentication security, we first briefly review the defini-
tion of a matching conversation.
Definition 3 (Matching Conversations): An authenticated
key exchange protocol P is a message-driven protocol and the
goal of P is to achieve a matching conversation. We first define
a protocol session of a party A as (A,B, s, role) where B
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is the identity of A’s partner, s is the session identifier, and
role can be either initiator or responder. A P with two
protocol sessions between a party A and a party B are of
the form (A,B, s, initiator) and (A,B, t, responder), re-
spectively. Two sessions are said to be a matching conversation
involving A and B if their session identifiers are identical and
the initiator and responder parties are A and B. If a protocol
P consists of more than two sessions and each pair of sessions
in sequence is a matching conversation, then P is said to be
a protocol of matching conversations.
We define mutual authentication based on the definition of
matching conversation as follows. P is a mutual authentication
protocol if for any polynomial time adversary A: (1) matching
conversation implies acceptance and (2) acceptance implies
matching conversation. The first condition says that if the ses-
sions of two parties consists of a matching conversation, then
the parties accept the authentication of each other. The second
condition says that if each party accepts the authentication
with the other party in a conversation, then the probability that
there is no matching conversation between them is negligible.
Formally, mutual authentication (MA) security is defined as:
Definition 4: An authentication protocol P is MA-Secure
(i.e., P satisfies MA-Security) if:
(1) Matching conversation implies acceptance: If oracles∏s
A,B and
∏t
B,A have matching conversations, then both
oracles accept the authentication of each other, AND
(2) Acceptance implies matching conversations: The prob-
ability of event NoMatchingA(k) is negligible, where k is a
security parameter and NoMatchingA(k) is the event that
there exist i, j, A, and B such that
∏i
A,B is accepted but
there is no oracle
∏j
B,A which is engaged in a matching
conversation.
The event NoMatchingA(k) can also be denoted as
SuccMAP (A) which is the probability that a polynomial-time
adversary A can successfully impersonate one of the two
interactive entities who want to authenticate each other in P .
Authentication Key Exchange (AKE) Security: In an
execution of an MA-Secure authentication protocol P , a
polynomial-time adversary A interacts with two fresh oracles:∏s
A,B and its partner
∏t
B,A. At the end of the execution, A
issues a Test query to one of the two fresh oracles. Then the
real session key or a random string is returned to A according
to the value of a random bit b. Finally, A outputs a bit b′ and
terminates the game. The AKE-Advantage, AdvAKEP (A), is
defined as |Pr [b = b′]− 1/2|. We give a formal definition of
AKE-Security below:
Definition 5 A protocol P is AKE-Secure if it satisfies the
following properties:
(1) At the beginning the adversary engages in the execution
of P with
∏s
A,B and its partner
∏t
B,A. Then both oracles can
accept and share the same session key with each other.
(2) P is MA-Secure.
(3) For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A,
AdvAKEP (A) is negligible.
When a Test query is issued before finishing the execution
of the protocol, the game is played as per the above definition
if the session key is generated by any one of the two fresh
parties. Otherwise, the Test query will be rejected.
B. Formal Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme is based on hash functions, which
can be considered as secure pseudorandom functions [19]. In
this section, we show that the proposed scheme is provably
secure based on the pseudorandom function assumption. As
mentioned earlier, even though our proposed scheme is based
on a three-party authentication and key exchange protocol, it
can be reduced to a two-party authentication and key exchange
protocol.
Lemma 1: If h is a (n0, q0, ε0)-secure pseudorandom
function family with negligible ε0, then the proposed authen-
tication scheme is MA-Secure.
Proof: Assume that there is a polynomial-time adversary
A who can break MA-Security of the proposed protocol P
with non-negligible probability SuccMAP (A). We construct a
polynomial time algorithm F using A to show that F can
break the pseudorandom function with non-negligible advan-
tage, thus providing a contradiction. Also, SuccMAP (A) =
Pr [SuccUser] + Pr [SuccSA] − Pr [SuccUser, SuccSA] ≤
Pr [SuccUser] + Pr [SuccSA], where SuccUser and SuccSA
are the events that A successfully impersonates as a legitimate
user and SA, respectively, to pass authentication. Therefore,
we split the proof into two cases, one for SA impersonation
and the other for user impersonation.
Case 1 (SA Impersonation): Assume that A can impersonate
as a SA with probability ǫ′. If A wants to be successfully
authenticated by a user (say Ui ) using
∏s
User,SA controlled
by F , A must correctly send V4 = h(SKu ||ki ||PID
new∗
i ). In
the following game, F will exploit the ability of A to break the
pseudorandom function assumption with ǫ′ ≤ 4ǫ0+2
−k, where
k is the security parameter. F plays the game in Definition 1
with challenger C as follows.
Initialization: Let the long-term secret key ki be k-bit long.
C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets up a secure one-way
hash function hb where h0 = hki is a pseudorandom function
and h1 is a random function. If F simulates the game by using
h1 to interact with A, we call this game a random experiment.
On the other hand, if F uses h0 to simulate the game, we call
this game a real experiment. The goal of F is to correctly
guess if hb = h0 or hb = h1 (i.e., b = 0 or b = 1).
Training: F simulates
∏s
User,SA and
∏t
SA,User to interact
with A by answering the following queries:
• Execute(
∏s
User,SA,
∏t
User,HG): F uses hb given by C
as hki in the protocol. F also randomly generates kh and
PIDnewi and then computes PID
new∗
i = h(PIDi ||ki) ⊕
PIDnewi , SKu = h(IDu ||ki ||Nu) ⊕ SK , and V4 =
h(SKu ||ki ||PID
new∗
i ). Subsequently, F simulates
∏s
User,SA
and
∏t
SA,User with the help of hb, PID
new∗
i , SKu , and V4.
• Send(
∏s
User,SA,m):
∏s
User,SA sends the request mes-
sage m = {PIDi, Nu,V1} of the protocol.
∏s
User,SA first
validates V1 by querying hb and then finds PIDi in its
database and then checks the correctness of V1 by querying
hb.
• Send(
∏t
SA,User,m): If m = {PIDi, Nu,V1},
then
∏t
SA,User computes PID
new∗
i = h(PIDi ||ki) ⊕
PIDnewi , k
HG
h = h(IDu ||ki ||Nu) ⊕ SK , and V4 =
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h(SKu ||ki ||PID
new∗
i ).
∏t
SA,User then responds by sending
{PIDnew∗i ,SKu ,V4} to A.
Challenge: First, A queries Send(
∏s
User,SA,m) to trigger
the protocol.
∏s
User,SA then sends m = {PIDi, Nu,V1} to
A. Then A generates the authentication response parameter V4
with success probability Pr [SuccSA] = ε
′. Thus, A queries
Send(
∏t
SA,User, {PID
new∗
i ,SKu ,V4}). After receiving this
query, F issues a query x∗ = h(SKu ||ki) to hb and obtains
the output V ∗4 = h(SKu ||ki ||PID
new∗
i ).
Guess: Finally, F outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If V ∗4 =
V 4 then F outputs 0; otherwise, F outputs a random bit 0 or
1.
The analysis of the probability that F can successfully
distinguish between the given hb (i.e., b = b
′) can be divided
into two cases: under a real experiment (i.e., b = 0), and
under a random experiment (i.e., b = 1). In the case of a real
experiment, A can successfully send the correct authentication
information to win the game with probability ε′. Hence, F
will output b′ = 0 with probability ǫ′ when A sends correct
authentication information under a real experiment. However,
if A sends wrong information, F can only make a random
guess for b, and thus F will output b′ = 0 with probability
(1 − ε′)/2. Thus, when b = 0, Pr[b = b′|b = 0] =
ε′ + (1 − ε′)/2. In the case of random experiments, A can
only send the correct authentication information by random
guessing and the probability of a correct guess is 2−k. Thus,
when b = 1, F outputs b′ = 1 with probability (1 − 2−k)/2
(i.e., Pr[b = b′|b = 1] = (1 − 2−k)/2). Combining the two
cases, we have
Pr [b = b′] = Pr [b = b′, b = 0] + Pr [b = b′, b = 1]
= (ε′ + (1− ε′)/2)1/2 + ((1− 2−k)/2)1/2
= 1/2 + ǫ′/4− 2−(k+2).
Thus we have
ε0 ≥ |Pr [b = b
′]− 1/2|
= ǫ′/4− 2−(k+2).
⇒ ǫ′ ≤ 4ε0 + 2
−k.
Case2 (User Impersonation): Suppose that A can imperson-
ate as a user with probability ε′′. If A wants to be accepted by∏t
SA,User, then A has to send out the correct authentication
information. Thus F plays the same game as in Case 1 with
C.
Initialization: C selects a hash function hb according to a
random bit b ∈ {0, 1} for answering the queries from F where
h0 = hki is a pseudorandom function and h1 is a random
function.
Training: F first selects the required Nu and PIDi
in the protocol. F then simulates
∏s
User,SA and∏t
SA,User by answering Execute(
∏s
User,SA,
∏t
SA,User)
and Send(
∏s
User,SA,m). The simulations of these oracles
are similar to those in Case 1.
Guess: F outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} according to PIDi
and V1. If PIDi and V1 are valid, then F outputs 0, implying
hb = hki ; otherwise it outputs a random bit 0 or 1.
The probability that A successfully sends out the correct
PIDi and V1 is ε
′′ in the real experiment and 2−k in the
random experiment. Following the analysis of Case 1, we have
Pr [b = b′] = 1/2 + ε′′/4− 2−(k+2)
⇒ ε
′′
≤ 4ǫ0 + 2
−k.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2,
SuccMAP (A) ≤ Pr [SuccSA] + Pr [SuccUser]
= ε′ + ε′′
≤ 8ǫ0 + 2
−(k−1).
From the above, ε0 is non-negligible, which contradicts the
assertion in the lemma’s statement that ε0 is negligible. Thus
we can conclude that the proposed authentication scheme is
MA-Secure. 
Lemma 2: If h is a (n0, q0, ε0)-secure pseudorandom
function family with negligible ε0, then the proposed scheme
is AKE-Secure.
Proof: In Lemma 1 we have proved that the proposed pro-
tocol P is MA-Secure. Now, consider an adversary A who can
break AKE-Security of P with non-negligible AdvAKEP (A) =
ε. We construct a simulator F using the ability of A to
break the pseudorandom function assumption [20]. F plays
the following game, as given in Definition 3, with a challenger
C.
Initialization: C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets
up a secure hash function hb for answering the queries from
F , where h0 = hki is a pseudorandom function and h1 is a
random function.
Training: F selects the required Ng and SIDi in the pro-
tocol. F then simulates
∏s
User,SA, and
∏t
SA,User by answer-
ing Execute(
∏s
HG,SA,
∏t
SA,HG) and Send(
∏s
User,SA,m),
respectively. The simulations of these oracles are similar to
those in the proof of Lemma 1.
• Test(
∏s
User,SA): If kh of
∏s
User,SA is generated, then
F randomly chooses c ∈ {0, 1}, and returns the real session
key kh if c = 0 or a random string for c = 1. Otherwise, F
returns ⊥, denoting meaninglessness.
• Test(
∏t
N,E): The simulation is the same as the one
above.
Challenge: After querying Execute(
∏s
HG,SA,
∏t
SA,HG),
A sends a Test query to F .
Guess: After querying Test(
∏s
User,SA) or
Test(
∏t
SA,User), A outputs a bit b = 0 if it thinks
that the responding string is the real session key; otherwise, it
outputs b = 1. Finally, F outputs b′ = 0 if b′ = b; otherwise
F outputs b′ = 1.
The analysis of the probability of the event b = b′ is similar
to that in the proof of Lemma 1. A can win the game by
successfully guessing b = b′ with probability (ε+1/2) under
a real experiment (i.e., b = 0). Also, A can only guess if b = b′
with probability 1/2 under a random experiment (i.e., b = 1).
If A successfully guesses b = b′, then F will output b′ = 1.
Therefore, the probability of b = b′ and b = 0 is (ε+1/2)1/2,
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Figure 3. Attack Tree.
and the probability of b = b′ and b = 1 is 1/4. Thus we have
Pr [b = b′] = Pr [b = b′, b = 0] + Pr [b = b′, b = 1]
= (ε+ 1/2)1/2 + 1/4
= 1/2 + ǫ/2
⇒ ǫ0 ≥ Pr [b = b
′]− 1/2
= ǫ/2
From the above, ε0 is non-negligible, and thus a contradic-
tion occurs. Therefore, AdvAKEP (A) is negligible for each
polynomial-time adversary A and P is AKE-Secure. 
C. Informal Security Analysis
So far, we have formally proved that the proposed scheme
can ensure AKE-security, which is imperative to achieve se-
curity against impersonation attacks or replay attacks, session
key security, etc. In this subsection we use the attack tree
shown in Fig. 3 to show how the proposed scheme ensures
some of the important security properties which are necessary
for EI-based V2G communications.
1) Protection Against Impersonation or Forgery Attacks:
In the proposed scheme, if an adversary tries to
impersonate as a legitimate user Useri , then he/she
needs to send a valid authentication request MA1 :
{PIDi ,Nu ,EL,V1}. However, the adversary cannot
provide the thumbprint βi and password pswi . There-
fore, he/she cannot use the mobile device and compute
ki = k
∗
i ⊕ h(βi||pswi), EL = LAIu
⊕
h(ki ||Nu), and
a valid key-hash response V1 = h(PIDi ||Nu ||ki ||EL),
which are essential to authenticate with the USP. On the
other hand, if the adversary tries to impersonate as a
legitimate service provider, then he/she must know the
secret keys Kcu and ki . Without knowing the secrets
Kcu and ki , the adversary cannot generate valid key-
hash responses V3 = h(SKcs ||Kcu ||Nc) and V4 =
h(SKu ||ki ||PID
new∗
i ). In our EI-based V2G communi-
cations model, charging/discharging rates vary based on
the location. A charging station CSj may try to cheat
the Useri by providing a false location identity LAIcs
to the USP and demand an inaccurate amount from the
user. The proposed scheme will be able to detect such
forgery attempts in the following way: the USP decodes
LAIu from the EL and then compares and validates
LAIu with LAIcs . If the validation is successful, then
only the USP will proceed with the execution of the
further steps. Otherwise, the USP will terminate the
execution of the protocol and take necessary against
the CS. Similarly, an user may intentionally provide
a forged LAIu in order to pay a lower amount for
charging or ask for a higher amount for discharging.
The USP will similarly be able to detect such attempts.
Next, we consider a scenario where the user’s mobile
device is lost or stolen. The adversary may try to use
this device to impersonate as a legitimate user. However,
in our proposed scheme we have considered multi-factor
security and the adversary cannot provide the valid
thumbprint βi and password pswi . Hence, he/she will
not be able to proceed with further execution of the
protocol. In this way, we can ensure security against
impersonation and forgery attacks.
2) Privacy of the User: In the proposed scheme, the user
needs to use a valid pseudo identity PIDi for each
session, which cannot be used twice. Therefore, no one
except the service provider can a recognize the activity
of the user. Besides, in case of loss of synchronization,
the user needs to use one of the unused shadow identities
sidj from SID = {sid1 , · · · , sidn}. After that, the user
deletes sidj from its memory. Therefore, changing the
pseudonym in each session ensures identity intractabil-
ity. This approach of the proposed scheme is quite useful
for achieving privacy against eavesdropper (PAE).
3) Protection Against Eavesdropping or Interception At-
tacks: In the proposed scheme, an adversary cannot
reuse the message MA1 : {PIDi ,Nu ,EL,V1} since
PIDi changes in each session. The adversary cannot
reuse message MA2 since a new random number Nc
is used in each session. Similarly, an adversary also
cannot resend the messages MA3 and MA4 since key-
hash response messages V3 and V4 change in each
session and they are generated based on the challenges
Nu and Nc , respectively. In this way, we ensure security
against replay attacks.
4) Protection Against Compromised User’s Device: Next,
we consider a scenario when an attacker hijacks the
car with the user’s device and forces the legitimate
user to input his/her password and thumbprint and then
change the password and the thumbprint. After that,
the adversary may try to ask for charging/discharging
services from the USP. In order to address this issue, the
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Table III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON SECURITY FEATURES
Scheme SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 SP6
Mohammadali et al. [4] Yes Yes No No Yes No
Nicanfar et al. [5] No No No No No No
Wu et al. [6] No No No No No No
Xia et al. [7] No No Yes No No No
Tsai et al. [9] Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Odelu et al. [10] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Proposed Scheme Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SP1: Privacy of customer; SP2: Privacy against eavesdropper; SP3: Resilience against man-in-the-middle attacks;
SP4: Forward secrecy; SP5: Session key security; SP6: Resilience against DoS attacks
Table IV
EXECUTION TIME OF VARIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
Operation User’s Device (HTC One Smartphone) USP/CS (Intel Core i5-4300 Machine)
Tmp 5.12 ms 2.6 ms
Tm 21.86 ms 14.5 ms
Tb 8.67 ms 3.78 ms
Tcertgen 55.946 ms -
Tcertver - 17.237 ms
Th 0.0186 ms 0.011 ms
Te 7.235 ms 2.338 ms
Ts 0.0584 ms 0.041 ms
Table V
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON COMPUTATION COST (IN MS) AND COMMUNICATION COST
Scheme User’s Device USP/CS Communication Cost
Mohammadali et al. [4] 2Tmp+Tm+Tcertgen+3Th≈88.15 3Tmp+Tm+Tcertver+4Th≈57.87 2340-bits
Nicanfar et al. [5] 3Tmp+Tm+Tcertgen+Th≈93.24 4Tmp+Tm+Tcertver+4Th+Ts≈63.77 2176-bits
Wu and Zhou [6] 2Tmp+Tm+Tcertgen+Th+Ts ≈92.38 3Tmp+Tm+Tcertver+3Th+Ts≈57.88 4064-bits
Xia and Wang [7] Ts+ 4Th≈0.13 Ts+ 4th≈0.085 3296-bits
Tsai and Lo [9] 4Tmp+Te+5Th≈27.85 3Tmp+Te+ 2Tb+5Th≈23.22 6880-bits
Odelu et al. [10] 3Tmp+Te+ 6Th≈22.74 2Tmp+Te+ 2Tb+6Th≈15.32 2912-bits
Proposed Scheme 6Th≈0.15 8Th≈0.88 1802-bits
Tmp : Time Required for a multiplication point operation; Tm : Time Required for a multiplication operation;
Te :Time Required for of a modular exponential operation; Ts :Time Required for a symmetric encryption/decryption;
Tb :Time Required for a bilinear pairing;Th : Time Required for a hash operation;
Tcertgen/ver : Time Required for a certificate generation/verification operation
legitimate user needs to inform such an incident to the
USP as soon as possible. After that, the USP will block
the user’s account. In addition, the USP can also place
a limit on the weekly or monthly charging/discharging
amount for an user. In this way, we can address the
scenario of compromised user devices.
5) Protection Against Physical Attacks: In the proposed
scheme we assume that all the devices (such as user’s
mobile device, EV, EVSE) are tamper proof. Therefore,
if an adversary attempts to perform any physical attacks,
they can be resisted by the hardware. In addition,
in order to deal with physical attacks, devices with
embedded physical uncloneable functions (PUFs) [11]
can also be used. Any attempt to tamper with the PUF
changes the behavior of the device and renders the
PUF useless, thereby making it possible to detect any
tampering attempts.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates and compares the performance of the
proposed scheme with respect to other authentication schemes
for smart grids. We first consider several imperative security
properties such as forward secrecy, session key security, etc.
for analyzing the performance of our proposed authentication
scheme on the security front with respect to other schemes
([4], [5], [6], [7], [9]). Table III shows that the schemes
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presented in [4], [5], [6], [7], [9], and [10] fail to guarantee
all the imperative security properties. Although Odelu et
al.’s scheme can provide various security features, it is not
robust against DoS attacks (as discussed in Section 1). In
contrast, the proposed scheme can ensure all the important
security features (as shown in Table III). For instance, in
our proposed scheme, the USP can quickly make a decision
against an invalid authentication request, which helps our
scheme to be resilient against DoS attacks. Next, we evaluate
the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of the
computation and communication costs. In this regard, we first
conduct simulations of the cryptographic operations used by
all the schemes on an Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine with
an Intel Core i5-4300 dual-core 2.60 GHz CPU (operating
as the USP/CS). To simulate a customer’s mobile device, we
use a HTC One smartphone with ARM Cortex-A9 MPCore
processor operating at 890 MHz. We use the JPBC library
Pbc-05.14 [21] and the JCE library [22] for evaluating the
computation times of different cryptographic operations used
in the proposed scheme and [4], [5], [6], [7], [9], and [10].
From Table IV we can see that the performance of the
proposed scheme in terms of computation and communication
costs is better than the others. Next, if we consider the existing
standards such as IEC 15118 and OCPP protocol for V2G
communications, then we find that like [4], [5], and [6], their
authentication and key-establishment schemes are based on
the computationally expensive ECDSA crypto-system, where
each signature generation takes 23.81 ms (at the user’s device)
and each signature verification (at the USP) takes 17.56 ms.
Besides, according to [32] and [33], these protocols also suffer
from several security issues (such as insecure against man-
in-the middle attacks, network impersonation attacks, DoS
attacks, etc.) and challenges. These protocols also expose some
important information such as customer name, vehicle iden-
tification number, charging location, and charging schedule,
which affects the customer’s privacy. Here, we argue that our
lightweight authentication and key establishment scheme can
easily be used by these underlying communication protocols
(such as IEC 15118 and OCPP) so that they can address all
the underlying security issues and ensure an enhanced security
level along with higher degree of efficiency.
Next, in order to comprehensively evaluate the practicality
of the proposed scheme, we consider the scalability of the
proposed scheme when deployed by organizations that own
charging stations. Since companies with large number of
charging stations do not exist yet, we use traditional gaso-
line refueling companies to obtain representative numbers.
In the USA, the biggest service providers are Shell (13727
stations), Chevron (6075 stations) and Exxon (5800 stations)
[34]. Current battery charging technologies for EVs may be
classified as either slow (energy flow rates of 2-6 KW) or
rapid charging (upto 150 KW) [35]. We consider EV models
Nissan LEAF (2018), Tesla Model S 100D and Mitsubishi
Outlander PHEV (2018) that come with battery capacities of
40 KHh, 100 KWh and 13.8 KWh, respectively. Assuming
a fast charging station with energy flow rate of 50 KWh, the
empty to full charging time for these vehicles is 1 hour, 2 hours
and 40 minutes, respectively. While a 150 KW rapid charger
takes 1 hour to charge the Tesla Model S 100D battery, the
Nissan and Mitsubishi models do not support this technology.
Thus we use one hour as a representative time for charging
current EVs in charging stations. The number of charging
points in CSs varies. For traditional (petrol) filling stations,
even in larger stations, studies indicate the average number is
18 (in Florida, [36]), i.e., 18 vehicles can fill up at the same
time. We use 18 as the number of charging points in a CS
and thus, 18 authentication requests are generated from a CS
every hour. Now, based on Table V, the communication cost
for the proposed protocol is 1802 bits = 226 bytes. On the
other hand, TCP + IP + Ethernet overhead = 20 + 20 + 24 =
64 bytes and during the authentication process 4 messages are
required to be exchanged. Therefore, the total communication
overhead = 226 + 4×64 = 482 bytes (approx. 500). The
computation time required at the USP is 0.00088 sec for
verifying an authentication request. Using Shell as an example,
we have 13800×18 = 248400 authentication requests per hour
(Shell has 13800 refilling stations). Therefore, the amount of
CPU time required every hour for verifying these transactions
is 0.00088 × 248400 = 219 seconds. A simple personal
computer or low end server can easily handle such computa-
tional requirements. The communication requirement of these
authentication requests is 500 × 248400 = 124200000 bytes
every hour = 276000 bits/sec = 276 Kbps. Thus, we conclude
that the proposed scheme can provide all the important security
properties and has lower (and practical) computation and
communication costs, and is hence suitable for EI-based V2G
communication.
VI. CONCLUSION
Secure and efficient key exchange is critical for ensur-
ing secure data exchange in the Energy Internet. Aiming
at the problem of safe communication between EV users,
the USP and CSs, this paper proposed an efficient privacy-
preserving authentication scheme for EI-based Vehicle-to-Grid
communication. In this regard, only lightweight cryptographic
primitives such as one-way non-collision hash functions have
been considered. We quantified the performance of our scheme
using theoretical analysis and simulation tools. Our scheme is
resilient against many security attacks, efficient in computation
and communication, and compares favorably with existing
related schemes.
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